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Case Comments
Judgments: Interest on Judgments-Limitation
on Recovery of Prejudgment Interest
Plaintiff employed defendant Maxwell Aircraft Service, Inc.
to modify the propellers on plaintiff's aircraft. During a subsequent flight, one of the modified propellers fractured, causing a crash which totally destroyed the aircraft. Plaintiff
brought an action in Minnesota district court alleging negligence in the performance of the modification work. The jury
returned a special verdict against defendant for the value of the
aircraft including interest on the claim from the date of loss.
On appeal the Minnesota Supreme Court found no reversible
error,' but held that interest could be awarded only from the
date of verdict. The court felt that since the claim was both
unliquidated - and not readily ascertainable by computation or
reference to a generally recognized standard such as market
value, an award of interest from the date of loss would be unfair
to the defendant, because he would have been deprived of the
right to stop the running of interest by tendering payment of
the amount due. Potter v. Hartzell Propeller, Inc., 189 N.W. 2d
499 (Minn. 1971).
1. The appeal raised three other issues for decision. First, defendant argued that the trial court imposed inconsistent foundational
requirements for the admissibility of expert testimony in permitting
plaintiff's expert to testify while refusing to allow defendant Maxwell's
president to give his opinion of the cause of the crash as an expert witness. While noting that in the same situation the court would have
permitted defendant's expert to testify, the court held that both decisions were within the proper discretion of the trial court since they
were neither clearly erroneous nor based on an erronenous legal standard. Second, the court rejected defendant Maxwell's contention that
defendants Martzell and Gopher Aviation, Inc. were concurrently negligent as a matter of law by stating that this was properly a question
for the jury since the evidence of their concurrent negligence was not so
clear and conclusive as to leave no room for different opinions among
reasonable men. Third, the trial court's decision to admit into evidence
the prior purchase price of the aircraft on the issue of damages was approved by the court since it was a fair reflection of the present market
value in that the prior sale was neither forced nor remote in time.
2. C. McCosxxcx, LAw or DAMAGES § 54 at 216 (1935):
[W]here the amount sued for may be arrived at by the process
of measurement or computation from the data given by the
proof, without any reliance upon opinion or discretion after the
concrete facts have been determined, the amount is liquidated...
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There is confusion and uncertainty caused by the cursory
treatment3 of the awarding of prejudgment interest 4 in cases
involving the destruction of property. The courts employ a
variety of rules and approaches. Underlying decisions in this
area are two basic goals: to penalize the defendant if he delays
payment to the plaintiff (i.e., a punitive theory); and to compensate the plaintiff for the additional damages caused by the
period of litigation (i.e., a compensation theory).
Under the punitive theory, a defendant either must offer
payment when damages are not substantially in dispute or be
held accountable for prejudgment interest.
This encourages
offers of payment in cases where there is a strong likelihood that
such offers would be accepted. 6 In cases where damages are
substantially in dispute, however, plaintiff's loss of the beneficial use of the money award apparently is viewed as a normal
cost of litigation which plaintiff can be expected to bear. By
contrast, under the compensation theory prejudgment interest is
7
viewed as part of plaintiff's recovery for the loss of his property.
Under this concept, part of the damage which plaintiff sustains
is the loss of the beneficial use of his property from the time
the defendant destroyed it until the repayment of the property's
monetary value.8
3. See Laycock v. Parker, 103 Wis. 161, 179, 79 N.W. 327, 332
(1899).
4. In Minnesota a more accurate term would be "preverdict interest" since interest from the date of verdict until judgment is awarded
by statute. MItNN. STAT. § 549.09 (1969).
5. If the fault in nonpayment of the claim rests with the defendant, he cannot complain if he is required to compensate for

the delay. If, on the other hand, the fault lies with the plaintiff ... he should not be penalized for the unwarranted conduct of the plaintiff, and required to pay damages for the delay
in the settlement of the claim.
Pierce v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co. (No. 2), 232 Pa. 170, 172, 81 A. 142, 143,
(1911).
6. Cf. M.NN R. Civ. P., Rule 68.02, which bars costs and disbursements to the plaintiff if he rejects a sufficient offer of payment of the
claim made by the defendant; Moosbrugger v. McGraw-Edison Co., 284
Minn. 143, 160, 170 N.W.2d 72, 82 (1969).
7. "Appellant erroneously assumes that prejudgment interest is
in the nature of a penalty. The objective, rather, is to provide 'just
compensation' for the plaintiffs." Rosa v. Insurance Co., 421 F.2d 390,
393 (9th Cir. 1970).
8. [A] principle which has evolved to practically unanimous
recognition [is] that the damages in a given case shall give full
compensation for the loss sustained. In other words, the great
weight of authority as expressed in the more recent and betterreasoned cases is to the effect that full compensation for damage
to or destruction of property requires that, even in the case of
unliquidated demands, account be taken of the period that
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The general rule in most jurisdictions is to grant prejudgment interest where the claim is readily ascertainable by computation or reference to a market or established value.0 While
courts usually do not refer expressly to the punitive or the compensation theory, it is this implicit choice of underlying rationale
that is responsible both for the divergent application of the
general rule in practice and for the widespread confusion in this
area generally.' 0

In Varco v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry.,1 an early negligence
action for the loss of two horses, the Minnesota Supreme Court
outlined a simple test to determine whether the plaintiff was
entitled to prejudgment interest:
[The award of prejudgment interest] was proper. It is not a
case in which exemplary damages were claimed or allowed,
and the basis of plaintiffs claim for compensation is the value
of the property destroyed. In such cases
interest is necessarHly
2
allowed for the indemnity of the party.'

Clearly in this case the court was relying on the compensation
theory. The interest was awarded simply because the plaintiff
had been deprived of the beneficial use of his property from
the date of loss.
In Swanson v. Andrus,'5 involving a claim for the loss of
future profits from a breach of contract, the court defined the
limits of its rule for granting prejudgment interest:
[T]his court has so allowed [prejudgment interest] as a matter
of law, even in cases where the demand was unliquidated, provided its pecuniary amount did not depend upon any contingencies, and was ascertainable by computation or by reference to generally recognized standards, such as market value
....

[I]nterest has not been allowed where the damages

claimed... were, any part of them, prospective or contingent,
or the amount thereof depended in whole or in part upon the
discretion of the jury.14
As examples of cases which do not require interest from the
elapsed between the damage and the award, and that allowance
be made for this period in the form of interest or its equivalent.
Annot., 36 A.L.R.2d 337, 345 (1954). See McCormack v. Hankscraft Co.,
281 Minn. 571, 161 N.W.2d 523 (1968); Emery v. Tio Roofing Co., 89 N.H.
165, 195 A. 409 (1937). For a good explanation of the compensation
theory, see Comment, 15 STA. L. Ev. 107 (1962).
9. See, e.g., Swanson v. Andrus, 83 Minn. 505, 510, 86 N.W. 465,
467 (1901); C. McCoRMncK, LAw or DAMAGES § 55 (1935); 47 C.J.S.
Interest § 19(b) (1946).
10. See Laycock v. Parker, 103 Wis. 161, 179, 79 N.W. 327, 332 (1899).
11. 30 Minn. 18, 13 N.W. 921 (1882).
12. Id. at 22, 13 N.W. at 922 (emphasis added).
13. 83 Min. 505, 86 N.W. 465 (1901).
14. Id. at 510, 86 N.W. at 467.
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date of loss, the court listed actions "for personal injuries, seduction, libel, slander, and false imprisonment"'1 5 and actions for
future lost profits, which are entirely prospective. 10 However,
the court noted that interest should be allowed from the date
of loss in actions "to recover for personal property having a
market value, which was converted, destroyed, or lost by the
act or negligence of the defendant.' 7
This classification
approach was a reasonable development, and quite consistent
with the Varco opinion.' s Like Varco, Swanson looks solely to
the compensation of the plaintiff, largely ignoring the defendant's behavior.
The most recent Minnesota cases indicate a trend away from
these early precedents, adopting the more restrictive punitive
theory of prejudgment interest. In Moosbrugger v. McGrawEdison Co.,' 9 the court, in justifying its refusal to award interest
on certain unliquidated claims, mentioned that "a defendant
does not know how much he owes until the verdict is reached. '"2 0
This represented a shift in reasoning by suggesting for the first
time that a defendant may have the right to avoid the payment
of interest unless he wrongfully prolongs the period of the
plaintiff's loss of beneficial use of the property. Such a rule
significantly de-emphasizes plaintiff's right to be compensated for
2
all of his injury. '
In the instant case, the plaintiff sued for the value of his
aircraft and interest from the date of loss. The court held that
plaintiff could recover interest only from the date of the ver15.

Id.

19.

284 Minn. 143, 170 N.W.2d 72 (1969).

16. The court saw two reasons why a defendant should not receive
prejudgment interest for losses associated with future profits. The profits were prospective in that the loss could not be traced to the date of
the breach of the contract. Interest from the date of breach would be
clearly unjust since the plaintiff suffered no finite loss of beneficial use
of the future profits. Also, ascertaining the amount of future profits
involves considerations which have no relation to market value of either
property or service, such as the chance of an accident with the workmen
or the project. Id. at 511, 86 N.W. at 467.
17. Id. at 510, 86 N.W. at 467.
18. Varco v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 30 Minn. 18, 13 N.W. 921
(1882).
20. Id. at 160, 170 N.W.2d at 82.
21. This right was emphasized in Minneapolis Harvestor Works v.
Bormallie, 29 Minn. 373, 375, 13 N.W. 149, 151 (1882).

"To afford the

party just compensation, since his damages accrued at a definite time, he
must be allowed interest, else the longer the delay the more inadequate
his compensation would prove to be."
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dict.22 In so doing, the court refined Moosbrugger and formally
announced a new policy to govern cases of prejudgment
interest:
[A]lithough... plaintiff actually suffers loss of use of his
money from the date of the wrongful act, for which loss he
theoretically should be compensated, it would nevertheless be
unreasonable to require defendant to compensate plaintiff for
this loss where defendant could not have readily determined
the amount of damages himself either by computation or reference to generally recognized standards such as market value.
The underlying principle is that one who cannot ascertain
the amount of damages for which he might be held liable
cannot be expected23 to tender payment and thereby stop the
running of interest.

The court's rule states that prejudgment interest will be
awarded in all cases in which defendant could be expected to
tender payment, 24 thus halting the accrual of interest. The
court's reliance on the concept of tender, however, seems misplaced, since in all cases tender forces the defendant to admit
liability. Where there is no substantial dispute over damages,
a defendant who attempts to avoid prejudgment interest by
tendering the amount due effectively gives up his right to contest liability since the plaintiff presumably will accept the
amount, thereby terminating the lawsuit. In situations like
Potter where plaintiff might not accept the tender-that is,
22. Even though the facts of the instant case are similar to the facts
of the Varco case and the claim is of a type allowed interest in the
Swanson opinion, the court here denied interest.
23. 189 N.W.2d at 504.
24. "Tender" is a term used to describe offers of payment or settlement in various legal situations. Perhaps the most common is the sales
contract "tender" of delivery by the seller which creates a concurrent
obligation in the buyer to "tender" payment. See Ux'onm COMMMnCIL
CODE § 2-301. Another area where a "tender" concept is employed is
the offer of payment or settlement. Under Mni R. Civ. P., Rule 68.02,
a sufficient offer will bar costs and disbursements. See note 6 supra.
At common law "tender" can be used to stop the running of interest in
a contract claim case. For example, a debtor, by tendering the amount
of his obligation, triggers the creditor's obligation to receive the payment and relieves himself of liability for subsequent interest. From the
brief reference to "tender" in Potter it is unclear what use of the term
was intended by the court.
It seems reasonably clear that tender as a bar to the accrual of
interest is a realistic concept only in cases of liquidated damages. This
is the only situation where the defendant will know the exact amount
due which is needed in order to make a specific and precise offer of
payment. Where the amount of damages are to some degree uncertain
the defendant will have to negotiate a settlement with the plaintiff in
order to terminate the case without trial. Perhaps the Potter court is
thinking more generally of an offer of payment or settlement when it
uses the term "tender."

[Vol. 56:739
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where damage is unliquidated, but readily ascertainable and
plaintiff reasonably believes himself entitled to an amount
greater than the amount offered by the defendant-there is a
slightly different problem with the court's rule. That is, despite
the contrary implication of the Potter court,2

5

it is generally

accepted that tender, to be effective, must include everything to
which the other party is entitled..2 6 It is not at all clear that
defendant's offer of payment would satisfy these technical
requirements and thereby stop the running of interest. In some
cases, then, the defendant might be left with no sure mechanism by which to avoid liability for prejudgment interest short
of tendering the full amount to which plaintiff believed himself
entitled. This would seem an extremely difficult decision for a
defendant, especially where liability and the amount of damages
are doubtful and contested in good faith. Despite this fact, the
Potter rule, which apparently seeks to penalize the defendant
for contesting liability, was adopted by the court without any
adequate explanation of the policies which might underlie
such a rule. This absence of policy justification is particularly
glaring in the case where damages are unliquidated but readily
ascertainable since the rule suggests that defendant not only
would be precluded from contesting liability but also could not
dispute the amount of damages.
Another difficulty with the court's decision in Potter is that
its test is extremely difficult to apply. The rule of the instant
case will involve courts in ad hoc determinations of whether
variations in market value are so great that the defendant
cannot "readily ascertain" what he owes. A striking example
of this problem is illustrated by Lacy v. Duluth, M. & I. R. Ry.,27
a breach of contract case brought to recover the cost of labor
and the rental value of well drilling equipment. There the
Minnesota Supreme Court allowed interest from the date of
breach, stating that "[t]he difference between the amount
25. The Potter court seems to think that in a "readily ascertainable" situation an offer of payment by the defendant will stop the
running of interest even though it does not satisfy the technical requirements of tender. See note 26 infra.
26. There are two main, technical requirements in order for a tender
to be effective in halting the running of interest. First, it must be a
specific offer of the exact amount due. See Spoon v. Frambach, 83 Minn.
301, 86 N.W. 106 (1901). In addition, the offer must be kept open by the
the debtor in order to halt the accrual of interest. See First Nat'l Bank
v. Schunk, 201 Minn. 359, 276 N.W. 290 (1937); 52 Am. Jur. Tender §
(1944).
27.

236 Minn. 104, 51 N.W.2d 831 (1952).
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claimed, $9,307.17, and the amount finally determined, $7,127.03,
does not appear to be so unreasonable as to justify a complete
denial of interest upon the latter amount ... ."28 In the instant
case estimates of the damages went up to $90,000 or $95,000
while the jury assessed them at $66,000. In percentage terms,
the variances between estimates in the two cases are quite similar.29 However, in Potter the court felt that such a divergence
demonstrated "the absence of an objective standard of measurement for this sophisticated kind of property."30 A less subjective test perhaps would avoid these problems. A better standard would be whether the claim is pecuniary in nature; in other
words, whether it was based on the loss of money or of property
having a discernible monetary value. For example, in the
instant case the jury based its verdict on what it felt was the
market value of this type of aircraft. This should demonstrate
to the court that an objective standard of measurement exists
for ascertaining damages.
Finally, the Potter rule, to the extent it is based on a punitive theory, disregards the fact that payment of prejudgment
interest does not penalize the defendant but merely prevents
his unjust enrichment. That is, it requires him only to return
the benefits presumably resulting for his use of the money
from the date of injury. By not awarding prejudgment interest,
the Potter decision may in fact encourage delay by defendant,
since by refusing to settle, he would not risk an increase in the
size of the judgment and would still be able to use the money
for his own benefit.
It seems clear that the Minnesota Supreme Court would
be well-advised to return to a rule consistent with its earlier
decisions based on the compensation theory. Any rule for
prejudgment interest in property damage cases should compensate the plaintiff fairly for his loss, prevent the defendant from
being unjustly enriched, and be sufficiently clear so that the
courts are able to apply it equitably. The best approach would
grant interest in all cases involving pecuniary loss resulting
from injury to property, except if the damage is merely contin28. Id. at 108, 51 N.W.2d at 834.
29. In the instant case a variance of 36.4% or 43.9% exists while in
Lacey the variance was 30.6%.
30. 189 N.W.2d at 504. It is noteworthy that both parties felt that
the market value of the aircraft was easily established. In fact, the
defendant felt it was as easy to discover the market value of such an
aircraft as that of an used car. See Brief for Appellant at 31-32.
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gent or prospective. 3 1 This would achieve the objective of fair
compensation within the scope of the widely used "readily
ascertainable" test for unliquidated claims. The division of
types of claims seen in Swanson v. Andrus32 reflects the reasonable proposition that pecuniary loss which occurs at a
fixed time is by its nature readily ascertainable, either by computation or reference to generally recognized standards. The
trend of modern tort law is to adopt the policy that the plaintiff should be compensated for his loss.3 This has replaced
the attempt to punish the defendant as the basis for awarding
damages. The test for awarding interest as damages should
parallel this general tort law development. A distinction based
on the pecuniary nature of the claim will provide a logical,
workable rule which is in line with this modem tort policy consideration of victim compensation.
One desirable modification, however, would be to allow the
trial judge discretionary power to reduce or eliminate interest
4
in cases where the plaintiff is responsible for unnecessary delay.'
The defendant would be aware that interest was accruing from
the date of loss and that he could not avoid paying it by showing at trial or on appeal that the pecuniary claim was not readily
ascertainable. However, the plaintiff would also know that
unreasonable delay on his part would jeopardize his compensation on the claim for the period before the verdict. This
approach encourages settlement by creating a situation where
neither party unjustly gains from delay. In addition, it would
encourage more uniform decisions by applying a clear rule based
on the solid policy of just compensation and would be more
equitable and practical than the approach of the instant case.

31.

See the discussion of contingent or prospective damages in

Swanson v. Andrews, 83 Minn. 505, 510-11, 86 N.W. 465, 467 (1901).

32. 83 Minn. 505, 510-11, 86 N.W. 465, 467 (1901).
33. For example, recent developments in the area of products liability have been based on a theory of compensation. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment c (1965).
34. This concept would be similar to the federal doctrine of awarding prejudgment interest according to considerations of fairness. See,
e.g., Board of Comm'rs v. United States, 308 U.S. 343, 352 (1939), in

which the court stated:
The cases teach that interest is not recovered according to a rigid
theory of compensation for money withheld, but is given in response to considerations of fairness. It is denied when its exaction would be inequitable.

Constitutional Law: Freedom of Religion-Forcing Treatment on Mental Patient over Objection on Religious
Grounds Violates First Amendment
Plaintiff was admitted to a state institution as an involuntary mental patient.' She was a 59 year old Christian Scientist
without dependents or relatives. When she was admitted, and
several times thereafter, plaintiff informed the hospital staff
that she would not submit to physical treatment or medication
due to her religious beliefs.2 Despite her repeated protests,
she was given medication (for the most part, heavy doses of
tranquilizers) continually from the time of her admission until
she was discharged several months later. After her release,
plaintiff brought suit under the federal civil rights statutes,3
maintaining that the defendants, 4 while acting under color of
state law, had violated her constitutional right to free exercise
of religion.5 The district court held that medical officials, when
1. Plaintiff was admitted pursuant to Section 78(1) of the New
York Mental Hygiene Law. Under this statute, the Director of any
state-approved mental hospital may retain for a period of 30 days any

person alleged to be mentally ill. The allegations of mental illness

need not be made by a physician.
2. Followers of Christian Science believe that they should not
accept medical treatment of a physical nature. Psychological treatment,
however, is acceptable. C. CAwLEY, TaE RIGHT TO LuvE 24-26 (1969).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970); 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (3) (1970).
4. The defendants in this suit were the Commissioner of Mental
Hygiene for the State of New York, the Director of the Psychiatric
Division of Bellevue Hospital, the Director of Central Islip State Hospital, and doctors on the staffs of Bellevue Hospital and Central
Islip State Hospital whose names were unknown to plaintiff.
Circuit Judge Moore, in his dissenting opinion, felt the appeal
should have been dismissed as moot as to the named defendants and
for lack of jurisdiction over the person as to the unnamed defendants,
citing Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971). Judge Moore
argued that since the named defendants were unaware of plaintiffs
beliefs or the treatment afforded her they could not be held liable.
"The doctrine of 'command responsibility' . . . can have no applicability to the chain of responsibility in the state executive branch." Winters v. Miller, 446 F.2d 65, 73 (2d Cir. 1971). The issue raised by Judge
Moore's argument was ignored by the majority opinion and is beyond
the scope of this Comment.
5. Plaintiff also challenged the constitutionality of Section 34(9)
of the New York Mental Hygiene Law which provides for the compulsory fingerprinting and photographing of state mental patients.
Plaintiff claimed that this procedure violated her Fourth Amendment
right to privacy, her Fifth Amendment right to substantive and procedural due process and her Fourteenth Amendment right to equal pro-
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they have acted in good faith in ordering treatment for a mentally ill patient, may not be held liable when appropriate treatment is given over the patient's objections.0 On appeal, the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the decision,
one judge dissenting. It held that absent a prior judicial determination of incompetency, the forcing of medication upon a
mental patient objecting to the treatment on religious grounds
is an unconstitutional infringement of the patient's right to free
exercise of religion, absent a showing that the treatment furthers a substantial interest of society or some third person.
Winters v. Miller, 446 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1971).
The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment generally
has been considered to protect two distinct freedoms: the freedom to believe and the freedom to act.7 While the freedom to
believe is absolute s the freedom to act may be subject to governmental restriction or prohibition even when the action is
compelled by religious conviction. 9 To determine when governmental interference with religious "action" is constitutionally permissible, the Supreme Court has employed a balancing
test, weighing the interest in free exercise of religion against
other competing interests of society. 10
A number of courts have used this balancing test to decide
when a patient may refuse treatment on religious grounds."
Most of the cases in this area deal with physically ill patients.
But in at least two instances the patient also was considered
tection. Both the district and circuit court found that the fingerprinting
and photographing of state mental patients served a legitimate government interest (the identification of injured, lost or incompetent patients) and that plaintiff's claims were "obviously without merit."
Winters v. Miller, 306 F. Supp. 1158, 1166 (E.D.N.Y. 1969), rev'd on

other grounds, 446 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1971).
6. Winters v. Miller, 306 F. Supp. 1158 (E.D.N.Y. 1969).
7. Id. at 1166.
8. Braunfield v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603 (1961); Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
9. Braunfield v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603 (1961); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
10.

West Virginia v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).

11. Application of Pres. and Dirs. of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d
1000, rehearing denied, 331 F.2d 1010

(D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied,

377 U.S. 978 (1964); United States v. George, 239 F. Supp. 752 (D.
Conn. 1965); In re Brooks, 32 Ill. 2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965);
Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Mem. Hosp. v. Anderson, 24 N.J. 421, 201

A.2d 537 (1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964); Powell v. Columbian
Presbyterian Medical Center, 49 Misc. 2d 215, 267 N.Y.S.2d 450 (Sup.

Ct. 1965); Collins v. Davis, 44 Misc. 2d 622, 254 N.Y.S.2d 666 (Sup. Ct.

1964).
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mentally competent. 12 In these cases the courts made it quite
clear that a patient's right to refuse treatment on religious
grounds must yield to a compelling state interest in ordering the
treatment. Obviously, the determinative issue is the definition
of a compelling state interest.
In Application of President and Directors of Georgetown
College,'8 the mother of a seven month old child voluntarily
entered the hospital for treatment of a ruptured ulcer. In the
opinion of four attending physicians, the patient would die
without the immediate administration of blood transfusions.
Due to their religious convictions,' 4 both the patient and her
husband refused to consent to the treatment. An emergency
order was granted authorizing the transfusions. The court reasoned that because the patient was in extremis and non compos
mentis she was no more able to make a rational decision than a
child. The court also pointed out that the patient had a responsibility to the community to care for her child, and the
state as parens patriae,could not tolerate parental conduct which
constituted child abandonment.' 5 As one commentator has
noted, "The conclusion suggested by this case is that the state
[as parens patriae] can order treatment where the adult patient
is either incompetent or has dependents to whom he has a responsibility of care."' 6
The leading case upholding the patient's right to refuse
treatment is In re Brooks.17 In that case plaintiff, a Jehovah's
Witness, successfully appealed an order that had authorized
12. Application of Pres. and Dirs. of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d

1000, rehearing denied 331 F.2d 1010 (D.C. Cir. 1964)), cert. denied

377 U.S. 978 (1964); In re Brooks, 32 Ill. 2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965).
13. 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
14. Plaintiff and her husband were Jehovah's Witnesses. The Jehovah's Witnesses religion prohibits the giving or accepting of blood
transfusions as a violation of God's Law. Their objection to blood
transfusions, which are equated with the "eating of blood," is based
on Biblical text. See Acts 15:28-29. See generally WATCHTOWER BLE
AND TRACT SOCIETY OF NEW YORK, INC., BLOOD, MEDICINE AND THE LAW

OF GOD (1961); How, Religion, Medicine and Law, 3 CAN. BAR J.365

(1960).
15. 331 F.2d at 1008. Accord, United States v. George, 239 F. Supp.
752 (D. Conn. 1965); Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Mem. Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537 (1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985
(1964); Powell v. Columbian Presbyterian Medical Center, 49 Misc. 2d
215, 267 N.Y.S.2d 450 (Sup. Ct. 1964); Collins v. Davis, 44 Misc. 2d 622,
254 N.YS..2d 66 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
16. Note, Compulsory Medical Treatment: The State's Interest Reevaluated,51 MINN. L. REv. 293, 300 (1966).
17. 32 Ill. 2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965).
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the administration of blood transfusions to her. The Supreme
Court of Illinois acknowledged that approaching death had so
weakened the faculties of the patient that she might properly
be considered incompetent. But it still held the authorization
of blood transfusions for the patient an unconstitutional interference with her right to the free exercise of her religion.
The Brooks court distinguished Georgetown College on the
ground that Mrs. Brooks had no small children or other dependents. However, the general tenor of the opinion indicates
that even in the Georgetown College situation the court would
deny the order.' 8 In any case, the patient's mental incapacity
alone does not justify state interference with her religious beliefs under Brooks.
Winters v. Miller is the first case to consider the right of
a mental patient to decline treatment on religious grounds. In
deciding the case, the district court adopted the reasoning of
Georgetown College:
In mental illness cases, the public interest in treating and curing
patients is greater than the public interest in cases of physical
illness ....
A mental patient . . . may be unable either to
seek appropriate treatment or to determine what treatment to
allow.' 9
The lower court further argued that the detrimental effects
resulting from failure to treat a mental patient were greater
than those resulting from failure to treat a physically ill patient:
For the physically ill person, where there are no dependent
children or communicable diseases involved, the danger from a
refusal, on religious or any other grounds, to allow a particular
type of treatment may be that the patient will die. Only the
patient and his immediate family are likely to be aggrieved
or injured as a result. On the other hand, where the mental
patient is not properly treated, the condition may progressively
worsen,
and the patient may become a public burden and ex20
pense.
The lower court concluded that the state's strong interest in the
treatment of mental patients, combined with the patient's assumed incapability of deciding on appropriate treatment, allowed the defendants to ignore plaintiff's religious objections.
The district court's position was based on a parens patriae
approach to the problem similar to that expressed in Georgetown College. The state's interest will outweigh the mental pa18. Note, Unauthorized Rendition of Lifesaving Medical Treatment, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 860, 872 n.56 (1965).
19. 306 F. Supp. at 1167.
20. Id.
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tient's right to refuse treatment in every case, since in every
case the state's strong interest in the treatment of mental pa-

tients will be present, as will the assumption that the patient
cannot rationally decide whether or not to accept treatment.
If the district court's reasoning is accepted, a compelling state
interest would be established by a mere showing that the individual objecting to treatment is an involuntary mental patient. In effect, once an individual enters a mental institution,
he no longer can exercise his right to refuse treatment on
religious grounds.
On appeal, therefore, the case presented two issues to the
circuit court. The court first had to determine whether any
involuntary mental patient can effectively assert the right to
decline treatment on religious grounds. It clearly recognized
that under the district court's reasoning, "[a]ny patient alleged
to be suffering from a mental illness of any kind ... loses
the right to make a decision on whether or not to accept treatment."2'
The appellate court could not accept this. Nor could
it accept the applicability of parens patriae to the present
situation. While the court conceded the state could ignore
plaintiff's religious convictions if it did stand in parens patriae
relationship to her, it argued that such a relationship does not
automatically arise whenever a person is committed to a state
mental institution. There first must be a judicial determination of the patient's competency. Absent such a hearing, the
court concluded that the patient retains the right to decline
22
treatment on religious grounds.
The appellate court rightly rejected the district court's decision. While the lower court conducted a balancing test of
sorts, its scales were faulty. First, the district court decision
gives unlimited discretion to hospital officials. Under the district court ruling doctors could order any treatment they consider desirable, even though it may be merely expedient under
the circumstances. One hardly can deny that it is easier to
administer medication than, for example, to give psychological
treatment to a patient. But if psychological treatment is just
as effective, as plaintiff had argued in the court below,2 3 should
a mere showing that medication is more expedient be a sufficient reason to deny the patient her constitutional right to the
free exercise of religion? There seems but one answer.
21. 446 F.2d at 68.
22.

Id. at 71.

23. 306 F. Supp. at 1170.
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Second, the district court decision fails to recognize that in
some cases the state's interest may not be very substantial.
As already pointed out, there may be instances where one type
of treatment is preferred over another simply because the one
is more expedient to administer. Or there may be cases where
the patient is neither dangerous nor disruptive and the treatment has little chance of success. In still other circumstances,
perhaps the individual should not be in the institution in the
first place.
Moreover, the district court decision is partially based on
the premise that a patient suffering from a mental illness of
any kind cannot competently decide whether or not to accept
treatment. This seems an unfounded assumption. "Absent a
specific finding of incompetence, the mental patient retains the
right to sue or defend in his own name, to sell or dispose of
his property, to marry, draft a will, and, in general to manage
his own affairs. '24 Surely, there also will be instances where
the mental patient can rationally decide whether or not to
accept treatment.
Finally, the district court's holding gives too little weight
to the patient's religious views. Absent a compelling state interest, every person has the right to practice freely a religion of
his own choice, no matter how controversial or unorthodox. The
district court's opinion withdraws this right from the involuntary mental patient even though interference may be unwarranted or arbitrary. Moreover, if the state's interest in the
treatment of mental patients prevails over this fundamental
right in every case, what rights can the involuntary mental
patient have? Theoretically, by invoking this same state interest medical officials could deny the involuntary mental patient any constitutional freedom so long as they did so in the
belief that it was in the patient's best interest.
The circuit court's decision, on the other hand, requires a
case by case balancing of interests, except where there has been
a judicial determination of incompetency. Thus the court insures that a mental patient does not forego his right to religious freedom simply by virtue of his involuntary admission
to the hospital. However, having determined that mental patients have a right to decline treatment on religious grounds,
the court still had to decide what state interests are sufficient
24. 446 F.2d at 68.
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to justify interference with that right and whether such interests were present in the instant case.
The circuit court's opinion describes two situations in which
the state's interest might justify action inconsistent with the
patient's religious convictions. First, where there has been a
judicial determination of legal incompetency, medical officials
could take any action they consider necessary to the patient's
welfare under the parens patriae doctrine. In the instant case,
there was no such determination of incompetency. Second,
medical officials could order treatment over the patient's religious objections if necessary "to prevent a grave and immediate danger to interests which the state may lawfully pro25
tect."
The circuit court seems to imply that if the hospital staff
were faced with an emergency their actions could be defended
as proper..2 6 But it concludes no such emergency existed in the
instant case and notes that plaintiff was not disruptive nor
dangerous.27 Indeed, the circuit court felt the defendants easily
could have waited for a judicial resolution of the issue.2 8 Further, there was no showing that the medication was necessary
to cure the patient, nor did the defendants answer plaintiff's
argument that psychological treatment would have been equally
as effective. On these facts, the case involved a non-emergency
situation where doctors had ordered medication repugnant to
the patient's religious views without showing that the medication was necessary to cure the patient or that it was the best
means of treatment available. Under these circumstances the
court's observation that "there is no evidence in the record that
would indicate that in forcing the unwanted medication on
Miss Winters the state was in any way protecting the interests
of society '29 is correct. The court could conclude only that the
defendants unconstitionally had violated the plaintiff's right to
the free exercise of her religion.
The Winters decision gives the same constitutional protection to the religious views of the mental patient as that given
the religious views of anyone else. 30 While the patient's mental
25. West Virginia v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
at 71.

446 F.2d at 70.
But cf. 306 F. Supp. at 1161.
446 F.2d at 71.
Id. at 70.
Absent a prior judicial determination of incompetency.

Id.
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illness may be very relevant in determining whether there is
sufficient state interest to justify interference with his right to
decline medical treatment on religious grounds, the court has
concluded that it is irrelevant in determining whether or not
that right exists in the first place. It is difficult to determine
what effect the Winters decision will have on the treatment of
mental patients. The court clearly recognized that, in the instant case, First Amendment rights were involved and the state
had to meet a more stringent standard in justifying its actions
than it would if other, nonfundamental rights were involved.
However, one effect of the Winters decision is predictable. Absent a judicial determination of incompetency, the Winters decision, in practice, will require state mental hospitals to get
prior judicial authorization before they take any action which
would interfere with the patient's religious views. This guarantees mental patients protection from arbitrary or unwarranted interference with their religious convictions.
When dealing with members of unconventional minority
religious sects, such as Christian Scientists and Jehovah's Witnesses, a sharp line must be drawn between the patient's illness
and his religious views. If a compelling state interest is present,
the doctor should be allowed to treat the illness, but in no case
should the patient's religious views be considered a symptom
of that illness. Winters v. Miller ensures that medical officials
will make this distinction.

